A Monetary History Of The United States, 1867-1960 Page

Today, the book is available in various formats, with Paperback editions and eBooks typically priced between $50 and $75.

The authors argued that the Depression was not a "market failure" but a "government failure." They blamed the Federal Reserve for allowing the money supply to shrink by one-third between 1929 and 1933. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960

The book's most famous section, Chapter 7 (often published separately as The Great Contraction ), reinterpreted the Great Depression. Today, the book is available in various formats,

Before this book, the prevailing Keynesian consensus held that monetary policy was largely ineffective, especially during deep downturns. Friedman and Schwartz challenged this by demonstrating that: Before this book, the prevailing Keynesian consensus held

Populist efforts for bimetallism and the deflationary pressures of the late 19th century.

They identified four critical errors, including raising interest rates in 1931 to defend the gold standard and failing to act as a "lender of last resort" to stop banking panics.

They utilized a "narrative approach," analyzing nearly a century of historical data to show that changes in money often preceded changes in economic activity, rather than just reacting to them. "The Great Contraction": A New History of the Depression